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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decades, convertible debt has become a major source of financing for 
companies around the world. The literature offers several potential explanations for 
the use of convertible debt by corporations. On the whole, the existing theories 
represent two different viewpoints on convertible debt. Green (1984), Brennan and 
Kraus (1987), Brennan and Schwartz (1988), and Mayers (1998) perceive 
convertibles as sweetened debt instruments that are able to alleviate various debt-
related financing costs. Stein (1992), in turn, perceives convertible debt as delayed (or 
‘backdoor’) equity financing that is well-suited for firms with high equity-related 
adverse selection costs. 
Empirical evidence on the issuer motivations behind convertible debt offerings 
consists mainly of managerial surveys. Recent survey results (Billingsley and Smith, 
1996; Graham and Harvey, 2001) provide evidence both for the sweetened debt and 
the delayed equity viewpoints on convertible debt. Lewis et al. (1999) study 
convertible debt issuer motivations in a more quantitative way, by developing a 
security choice model incorporating straight debt, convertible debt, and equity. They 
find that debt-like convertibles (i.e., convertibles with a small probability of being 
converted into equity) serve as sweetened debt instruments, whereas equity-like 
convertibles (i.e., convertibles with a high probability of being converted into equity) 
are used as delayed equity financing.  
The above-mentioned empirical studies all focus on convertibles issued by US 
companies, and may thus reflect the specific characteristics of the US convertible debt 
market. Thus far, very little is known about the motivations for convertibles issued in 
other environments, such as the Western European market. This paper intends to fill 
this gap in the literature by studying the determinants driving Western European 
convertible debt issues.  
The Western European convertible debt market provides an interesting laboratory 
for testing the validity of US-developed rationales on convertible debt for the 
following reasons. First, while this market only gained momentum since the 1990s, it 
has experienced a dramatic growth over the past fifteen years.1 Second, there are 
several striking differences between European and US convertible debt (issuers). As 
shown by Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2004), European convertibles have a 
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significantly larger debt component size than US convertibles. Moreover, whereas US 
convertible debt issuers are small, high-growth firms with high risk levels (Essig, 
1991; Lewis et al., 1999, 2003), European convertible debt issuers tend to be very 
large, financially healthy, mature companies (Noddings et al., 2001; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004a; Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2004). Brennan and Schwartz (1988) 
literally state that: ‘for large, mature corporations with strong credit ratings, there 
still appears to be no good reason for issuing convertibles’. Hence, the motivation for 
Western European companies to issue convertibles remains a puzzle.  
This study aims to shed more light on the factors that induce Western European 
companies to issue convertible debt instead of standard financing instruments, by 
exploring a unique pan-Western European dataset of 419 straight debt issues, 179 
convertible debt issues, and 214 equity issues made between 1994 and 2004. We use a 
similar security choice framework as in Lewis et al. (1999) to assess the validity of 
the sweetened debt and the delayed equity viewpoints on convertible debt in a 
European context. We also extend Lewis et al.’s (1999) analysis, however, by 
incorporating macroeconomic determinants as well as equity and straight debt market 
conditions in the security choice analysis. Moreover, we exploit the cross-country 
nature of our dataset to examine the influence of international differences in business 
laws on convertible debt issuance decisions.  
To date, there are only two other papers in the literature that analyze European 
convertible debt issuer motivations, being the survey analyses of Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004a,b).2 Our study complements and extends Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004a,b) 
analyses by focusing on observed managerial convertible debt choices rather than on 
managerial perceptions on convertible debt, and by differentiating between debt-like 
and equity-like convertibles. Our most important empirical results are the following. 
First, we find that Western European companies use convertible debt mainly as a 
sweetened debt instrument, not as delayed equity financing. This is also reflected in 
the highly debt-like design of most Western European convertible offerings: the 
median conversion probability of these instruments is only 27.16%, and very few 
issues are callable. Thus, whereas Lewis et al. (1999) obtain evidence both for the 
sweetened debt and the delayed equity viewpoints on convertible debt, our findings 
only support the former viewpoint. We identify both supply- and demand-related 
factors that might explain the differences in issuer motivations between European and 
US convertibles uncovered by our study.  
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Second, we show that macroeconomic and security market conditions have a 
significant incremental impact over firm-specific characteristics on convertible debt 
choices. For example, we find that companies are more likely to substitute convertible 
debt for straight debt during periods with low straight debt issuance volumes (i.e., 
‘non-hot’ straight debt markets). To the extent that these periods represent windows 
with higher economy-wide debt-related financing costs (as implied by the rationale of 
Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), this result provides additional support that Western 
European convertibles are used as sweetened debt issues.  
Lastly, we find some evidence that convertible debt issuance decisions depend on 
the level of creditor and shareholder protection offered by the commercial law of the 
issuing firm’s country of domicile. We also document that, all else equal, French 
firms are more likely than other Western European companies to issue convertible 
debt instead of straight debt or equity.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
provide an overview of the literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 describes 
the research methodology. Section 4 documents the security choice model results, and 
compares our findings with those obtained by other studies on the motivations for 
convertible debt offerings. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Determinants of the choice between convertibles, straight debt and equity 
 
2.1. Influence of firm-specific financing costs 
 
A number of theoretical rationales yield predictions on the firm types for which 
convertible debt offerings are most appropriate. Together, these rationales represent 
two different perceptions on the role performed by convertible debt.  
Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brennan and Schwartz (1988), and 
Mayers (1998) model convertible debt as a suitable financing instrument for firms that 
wish to issue a debt-type security, but want to avoid some of the costs that would be 
associated with a straight debt financing. These models all assume that high equity-
related financing costs prevent firms from issuing equity. Their common starting point 
is a firm that needs to choose between issuing convertible debt or straight debt.  
Green (1984) argues that convertible bonds are appropriate instruments for firms 
that want to mitigate asset substitution costs arising from the presence of risky debt. 
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The underlying idea of his model is that, by adding a conversion option to their bond 
issues, firms allow bondholders to participate in the upside potential of their stock. 
Convertibles thus reduce the value of the stockholders’ residual claim, thereby 
weakening the stockholders’ tendency to engage in more risky projects. According to 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), in turn, convertible 
debt can be used to mitigate adverse selection costs resulting from uncertainty about 
the current and future risk of the issuing firm. When there is such risk uncertainty, 
new bondholders will require an additional lemon’s premium over the interest rate 
that they would normally ask if there were perfect information on firm risk. Brennan 
and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that companies can reduce 
this adverse selection problem by issuing convertibles instead of straight bonds. The 
reason why is that the negative impact of firm risk increases on the bond component 
of convertibles will be partly offset by the positive impact of firm risk increases on 
their equity component. As a result, the total value of convertible issues will be less 
affected by the issuing company’s risk. Lastly, Mayers (1998) demonstrates that 
convertible debt is more suitable for financing a sequence of investment options of 
uncertain value than either short- or long-term bonds. On the one hand, convertibles 
are able to economize on the issue costs that would be associated with multiple short-
term debt offerings, since conversion leaves funds inside the firm. On the other hand, 
unlike long-term bonds, convertibles control for the stockholders’ tendency to 
overinvest in projects with a negative NPV by returning the funds to bondholders 
through redemption when the investment option is not valuable. Unlike the previous 
three rationales, Mayers (1998) relies on the critical assumption that convertibles are 
callable. By calling their outstanding convertible debt, companies are able to force 
conversion of the convertible debt into equity when the investment option turns out to 
be valuable.  
The above-cited models differ with respect to the specific debt-related financing 
costs that they consider to be mitigated by convertible debt, i.e., asset substitution 
costs in Green (1984), adverse selection costs resulting from uncertainty about firm 
risk in Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), and 
overinvestment costs resulting from uncertainty about the value of a future investment 
project in Mayers (1998). Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Section 3, the 
variables that can be used to proxy these different debt-related financing costs are 
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largely similar. Thus, we can only assess the collective validity of these models in our 
quantitative security choice analysis.  
Whereas Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brennan and Schwartz (1988), 
and Mayers (1998) perceive convertibles as substitutes for straight debt, Stein (1992) 
perceives convertibles as substitutes for equity. More particularly, he models 
convertible debt as a suitable financing instrument for firms that have to issue an 
equity-type security because of prohibitively high financial distress costs, but want to 
avoid some of the adverse selection costs that would be associated with a common 
equity financing. Since convertible debt has a smaller equity component than equity, 
it is less likely to be perceived as a signal of firm overvaluation, thus inducing smaller 
adverse selection costs. Similar to Mayers (1998), Stein (1992) provides a critical role 
for the call provision in convertible debt. By calling their outstanding convertibles, 
issuers can force the bondholders to convert their bonds into shares in the near future, 
and thus obtain equity ‘through the backdoor’.  
Lewis et al. (1999) are the first to show that the above-discussed sweetened debt 
and delayed equity viewpoints on convertible debt are not mutually exclusive. They 
hypothesize that firms follow a two-step decision procedure when confronted with the 
choice between straight debt, convertible debt, and equity. In a first step, firms decide 
between issuing a debt-type security (straight debt or debt-like convertible debt) or an 
equity-type security (equity-like convertible debt or equity), depending on the relative 
magnitude of their debt- and equity-related financing costs. In a second step, within 
the debt-type security group, firms need to choose between debt-like convertible debt 
and straight debt. The latter choice menu corresponds with the setup of the sweetened 
debt rationales of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988), and Mayers (1998). As discussed earlier, these models all imply that firms 
with high debt-related financing costs should issue debt-like convertible debt instead 
of straight debt. Within the equity-type security group, in turn, firms need to choose 
between equity-like convertible debt and equity. This choice menu corresponds with 
the setup of the delayed equity rationale of Stein (1992). According to this rationale, 
firms with high equity-related adverse selection costs should prefer equity-like 
convertible debt over equity. Lewis et al. (1999) thus reconcile two, at first sight 
mutually exclusive theoretical viewpoints on convertible debt by subdividing the 
convertible debt universe into debt-like and equity-like convertibles. They 
 6
 
hypothesize that the former instruments serve as sweetened debt issues, whereas the 
latter instruments serve as backdoor equity.  
In this paper, we adopt a similar two-step security choice framework as in Lewis 
et al. (1999) to assess the validity of the sweetened debt and delayed equity 
viewpoints on convertible debt in a Western European context. We evaluate the joint 
validity of the sweetened debt rationales of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988), and Mayers (1998) by testing the following 
hypothesis:3
 
Hypothesis H1a: 
Conditioning on a debt-type security choice, companies with high debt-related 
financing costs substitute debt-like convertible debt for straight debt. 
 
In turn, we assess the validity of the delayed equity rationale of Stein (1992) by 
testing the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis H1b: 
Conditioning on an equity-type security choice, companies with high equity-
related adverse selection costs substitute equity-like convertible debt for equity.  
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of prior empirical evidence regarding the different 
theoretical rationales on convertible debt.4 Early survey results obtained by Pilcher 
(1955) and Brigham (1966) are mainly consistent with the delayed equity viewpoint. 
More recent survey analyses, however, report evidence both for the sweetened debt 
and the delayed equity rationales on convertible debt (Billingsley and Smith, 1996; 
Graham and Harvey, 2001). Lewis et al. (1999) shed more light on the mixed nature 
of these survey results by showing that convertibles can be used both as sweetened 
debt and as delayed equity, albeit not by the same firm types. More particularly, in 
line with their proposed security choice framework discussed above, they find that 
debt-like convertibles are issued as substitutes for straight debt by firms with high 
debt-related financing costs, whereas equity-like convertibles are issued as substitutes 
for equity by firms with high equity-related financing costs.  
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The findings of Bancel and Mittoo (2004a,b) are very relevant in the context of 
our study, since these authors also focus on Western European firms. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2004a) obtain support for the two different viewpoints on convertible debt. 
Interestingly, their results indicate that the delayed equity motivation is more 
important for French firms than for other European companies. Bancel and Mittoo’s 
(2004b) findings are mainly consistent with the delayed equity perception on 
convertible debt.  
 
2.2. Influence of economy-wide financing costs 
 
The above-discussed convertible debt rationales imply that a firm’s decision to 
issue convertibles instead of straight debt or equity is driven by its own level of debt- 
and equity-related financing costs. Several authors, however, argue that financing 
costs vary not only on a firm-specific level but also on an economy-wide level, e.g., 
due to temporal fluctuations in the availability of profitable investment opportunities 
and in the level of asymmetric information about firm value and firm risk (Choe et al., 
1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Krishnaswami and 
Yaman, 2004). For this reason, we include economy-wide debt- and equity-related 
cost measures in addition to firm-specific financing cost measures in our security 
choice analysis. Our testable hypotheses (conditional on the earlier-discussed two-step 
security choice framework proposed by Lewis et al., 1999) are the following: 
 
Hypothesis H2a: 
Conditioning on a debt-type security choice, companies substitute debt-like 
convertible debt for straight debt during periods with high economy-wide debt-
related financing costs.  
 
Hypothesis H2b: 
Conditioning on an equity-type security choice, companies substitute equity-like 
convertible debt for equity during periods with high economy-wide equity-related 
financing costs.  
 
In other words, we predict that companies use debt-like convertibles not only to 
sweeten high idiosyncratic debt-related financing costs but also to mitigate high 
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economy-wide debt-related financing costs. Similarly, we expect that equity-like 
convertibles serve to alleviate both firm-specific and aggregate equity-related adverse 
selection costs. 
Some studies (e.g., Choe et al., 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) use 
macroeconomic variables to measure temporal fluctuations in economy-wide 
financing costs. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), however, state that macroeconomic 
determinants are likely to omit some of the relevant financing costs faced by security 
issuers. They argue that security issuance volumes are more representative (inverse) 
proxies for economy-wide levels of financing costs, since companies time their 
security offerings during periods when these costs are lowest (thus giving rise to hot 
security market conditions).  
Prior empirical evidence on the impact of aggregate financing costs on the choice 
between straight debt, convertible debt and equity is scarce and inconsistent. Lewis et 
al. (1999) report that companies are more likely to issue convertibles instead of 
straight debt when economic prospects (as measured by the leading economic 
indicator) are favorable. Krishnaswami and Yaman (2004), by contrast, find that 
companies substitute convertibles for straight debt when economic prospects are 
unfavorable and debt-related financing costs (as proxied by Treasury Bond yields) are 
high, which is in line with our hypothesis H2a. They do not examine the impact of 
economy-wide financing costs on the choice between convertible debt and equity, 
however. Lastly, Billingsley et al. (1988) find that, during hot equity windows, firms 
are more likely to issue equity instead of convertibles, and convertibles instead of 
straight debt. They do not incorporate macroeconomic conditions in their analysis. 
Our paper extends the above studies by simultaneously examining the impact of 
macroeconomic determinants and security market conditions on the choice between 
convertible debt, straight debt, and equity.  
 
2.3. Influence of creditor and shareholder protection rights 
 
Since La Porta et al.’s (1997, 1998) seminal papers, a large body of literature has 
studied the influence of commercial law on corporate financing choices.5 Korkeamaki 
(2005) is the first to examine the impact of international differences in business laws 
on the way in which convertibles are structured. He hypothesizes that firms domiciled 
in countries with weak shareholder protection and/or strong creditor protection rights 
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design their convertibles to be more debt-like in nature, and obtains evidence 
consistent with this prediction. While Korkeamaki (2005) conditions on companies 
that have chosen to issue convertible debt, our paper also considers straight debt and 
equity as viable security choices. Similar to Korkeamaki (2005), we assume that 
investors domiciled in countries with weaker creditor (shareholder) protection rights 
prefer security types with a smaller debt (equity) component size, and that firms 
design their security offerings accordingly. We thus obtain the following hypotheses 
(again conditional on the sequential security choice framework discussed earlier): 
 
Hypothesis H3a:  
Conditioning on a debt-type security choice, companies domiciled in countries 
with weaker creditor protection rights substitute debt-like convertible debt for 
straight debt. 
 
Hypothesis H3b: 
Conditioning on an equity-type security choice, companies domiciled in countries 
with weaker shareholder protection rights substitute equity-like convertible debt 
for equity. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Sample construction 
 
The dataset used for testing the above hypotheses is constructed as follows. In a 
first step, we download lists of all straight debt, convertible debt, and equity offerings 
made by Western European industrial companies between January 1994 and 
December 2004 from Bloomberg Thomson Financial. We a priori exclude issues 
made by financial companies and utilities from our search, since the capital structure 
policy of such firms is often driven by regulatory aspects. In this way, we obtain a raw 
dataset of 879 bond offerings, 395 convertible debt offerings, and 677 equity offerings.  
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In a next step, we impose the following criteria for inclusion in the final sample:  
- The issuing company is headquartered in Western Europe (exclude 
subsidiaries of non-Western European firms); 
- The issuing firm’s accounting and stock price data for the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the announcement date are available on Datastream; 
- Security-related data (e.g., conversion premium of the convertible debt issues, 
amount issued,…) are available on Bloomberg; 
- The announcement and issue date of the offering are available on Bloomberg. 
Subsequently, we impose a number of additional criteria on the individual security 
samples. We describe these requirements in detail in the Appendix.  
After applying these filters, we are left with a final sample of 419 straight debt 
issues made by 256 firms, 179 convertible debt issues made by 148 firms, and 214 
equity issues made by 192 firms.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the straight debt, convertible debt, and equity 
samples sorted by issue year. In line with previous studies (Choe et al., 1993; Bayless 
and Chaplinsky, 1996; Lewis et al., 2003), we find that there are substantial temporal 
fluctuations in equity and convertible debt offering volumes. There is also 
considerable time variation in the number of straight debt offerings. Following the 
rationale of Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), these security volume fluctuations might 
reflect changes in aggregate levels of equity- and debt-related financing costs over 
time.  
Panel B of Table 2 displays the three security samples sorted by country of 
domicile of the issuing company. The table reveals that more than 40% of the 
convertible debt issues are made by French firms. Earlier studies have also 
documented the dominance of France in the European convertible debt market 
(Ammann et al., 2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004a). In the straight debt sample, there is 
a large presence of issues made by companies domiciled in France (26.25%) and the 
UK (20.29%). The equity sample, in turn, comprises a very large number of offerings 
made by UK firms (37.38%). In the security choice analysis, we will control for this 
geographical clustering within the security samples.  
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here>> 
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3.2. Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables included in our security choice analysis fall into three 
categories: firm-specific financing cost measures, economy-wide financing cost 
measures, and country-specific measures. Below, we specify the proxy variables 
belonging to each of these categories and report some descriptive statistics. 
 
3.2.1. Firm-specific financing cost measures  
Testing hypothesis H1a requires that we include proxies for the level of debt-
related financing costs of the security issuers in the analysis. To avoid a simultaneity 
bias, all characteristics are measured at fiscal year-end preceding the security 
announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. 
Our first debt-related cost proxy is the leverage ratio, calculated as the ratio of 
total debt divided by total assets. Firms with a higher leverage have a higher potential 
for asset substitution and risk-related adverse selection costs (i.e., the debt-related 
financing costs considered by the models of Green, 1984; Brennan and Kraus, 1987; 
and Brennan and Schwartz, 1988). Moreover, a higher leverage enhances the 
attractiveness of convertible debt as a sequential-financing device, since potential 
savings from being able to reduce debt through calling the convertible should be 
larger when current leverage is higher (Mayers, 1998). As a second debt-related cost 
proxy, we include the daily stock return volatility. In line with Lewis et al. (1999, 
2003), we measure this variable over the trading days -240 to -40 relative to the 
announcement date. Firms with a higher stock return volatility are assumed to face 
higher asset substitution and risk-related adverse selection costs. Moreover, such 
firms are likely to face more uncertainty regarding the value of future investment 
projects, which should make convertible debt more attractive as a sequential-financing 
vehicle. Our last debt-related cost measure is the ratio of taxes paid to total assets. In 
contrast with the previous two proxies, this variable is not directly related to specific 
convertible debt rationales, but rather to capital structure theory in general. Firms with 
a higher amount of tax liabilities benefit more from a debt(-type) issue, since interest 
payments can be deducted from corporate tax payments. The tax ratio thus acts as an 
inverse debt-related cost measure (Lewis et al., 2003).  
Testing hypothesis H1b requires an assessment of the level of equity-related 
financing costs faced by the security issuers. The following standard proxy variables 
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are used to capture these financing costs (see, for example, Lewis et al., 1999, 2003; 
Chang et al., 2004). The first equity-related cost measure is the amount of slack 
capital, calculated as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities divided by total 
assets. When a firm with sufficient slack capital issues securities, stockholders are 
more likely to infer that this firm is overvalued, since undervalued firms would rather 
resort to an internal slack financing. Therefore, firms with a large amount of slack 
capital are expected to incur higher equity-related adverse selection costs (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). A second equity-related cost proxy is the issue size divided by the 
market value of equity measured one week prior to the announcement date. According 
to Krasker (1986), issues with large offering proceeds increase the potential for wealth 
losses by existing shareholders, and should thus be associated with higher adverse 
selection costs. As a last (inverse) equity-related cost measure, we include the pre-
announcement stock price runup. In line with Lewis et al. (1999, 2003), we measure 
this variable over the 75 trading days preceding the announcement date of the 
offering. We expect the stock runup to have a positive impact on the probability of a 
more equity-like security choice.  
We also include two issuer characteristics that act as proxies for both debt- and 
equity-related financing costs in the analysis. First, we control for the availability of 
profitable growth opportunities by including the market to book ratio, calculated as 
the sum of total assets plus the market value of common equity minus the book value 
of common equity divided by total assets. Firms with a larger market to book ratio 
tend to have higher levels of asymmetric information about their (future) value and 
risk, and thus higher costs of attracting both straight debt and equity (Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1988; Lewis et al., 1999). Moreover, the availability of growth 
opportunities increases the likelihood that convertible debt will be used as a 
sequential-financing tool (Mayers, 1998). As a second control variable, we include the 
issuing firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
It is generally assumed that larger firms face smaller information asymmetries 
regarding their (future) value and risk, and hence lower debt- and equity-related 
financing costs (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Lewis et al., 1999).  
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 provide an overview of the mean and median values 
of the above-cited firm-specific characteristics for the straight debt, convertible debt 
and equity samples. D (D-) denotes an (inverse) debt-related cost proxy, E (E-) 
denotes an (inverse) equity-related cost proxy. All variables are winsorized at 1%.  
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<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
Comparing the descriptive statistics obtained for our Western European 
convertible debt sample with those provided by US-based studies reveals that 
European convertible debt issuers are substantially larger than their US counterparts. 
Whereas the typical US convertible debt issuer has an average (median) total assets 
size in the order of $ 1 billion ($ 300 million) (Mayers, 1998; Lewis et al., 1999, 2003; 
Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2004), we find that European issuers are on average more 
than five times as large. To the extent that firm size acts as an inverse proxy for the 
level of asymmetric information about firm value and risk, this observation suggests 
that European convertible debt issuers do not face high costs of attracting straight debt 
and equity financing, which is inconsistent with the profile of the typical convertible 
debt candidate suggested by the theoretical rationales described in Section 2. The total 
assets sizes recorded for our European straight debt and equity samples are also 
substantially higher than the sizes recorded for US straight debt and seasoned equity 
issuers, however. Thus, a large size seems to be a feature of European security issuers 
in general, rather than a specific characteristic of European convertible debt issuers. 
Pagano et al. (1998) suggest that the larger size of European security issuers is mainly 
attributable to a lack of legal enforcement rights for minority investors in Europe. 
This makes it hard for small and young European companies to get access to public 
capital markets.  
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 provide t-test statistics for pairwise comparisons 
of convertible debt and straight debt issuers and convertible debt and equity issuers, 
respectively. For completeness, we also report univariate test results for a straight debt 
versus equity comparison in Column (6). According to the sweetened debt viewpoint 
on convertible debt, convertible debt issuers should face higher debt-related financing 
costs than straight debt issuers. Consistent with this prediction, we find that 
convertible debt issuers have a significantly higher stock return volatility and market 
to book ratio, and a significantly smaller total assets size than their straight debt 
issuing counterparts. They also have a significantly smaller leverage ratio than the 
straight debt issuers, however, which is not consistent with the sweetened debt 
perception. Convertible debt and straight debt issuers also differ with regards to their 
levels of equity-related financing costs. The t-statistics for the slack capital and the 
 14
 
relative issue size indicate that convertible issuers have significantly higher equity-
related financing costs than straight debt issuers, which is not what we would expect 
based on the equity-linked nature of convertible debt. The finding that convertible 
debt issuers have a significantly higher pre-announcement stock runup than straight 
debt issuers is in line with our expectations, however.  
Based on the delayed equity viewpoint on convertible debt, we expect convertible 
debt issuers to face higher equity-related financing costs than equity issuers. The 
results presented in Column (5) are inconsistent with this prediction, as they indicate 
that convertible debt issuers have a significantly smaller slack capital and market to 
book ratio, and a significantly larger total assets size than equity issuers. Of course, 
univariate test results as presented in Table 3 only enable a very crude assessment of 
the validity of the sweetened debt and delayed equity viewpoints. In the next section, 
we will use a more sophisticated two-step regression procedure for examining 
convertible debt issuer motivations in a multivariate context. 
 
3.2.2. Economy-wide financing cost measures 
As previously argued, we use both macroeconomic determinants and security 
issuance volumes to test hypotheses H2a and H2b. We include the 6-month leading 
indicator for the European economy (obtained from the OECD) as a general business 
conditions proxy. In line with Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), we measure this 
variable as the average level of the index over the three months prior to the issue 
month relative to the average level of the index over the 12 months preceding the 
issue month. Since both debt- and equity-related financing costs tend to be lower 
during business expansions (Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2004), we cannot predict the 
impact of the leading indicator on the likelihood of a more debt-like security offering. 
The 5-year German Treasury Bond yield (obtained from International Financial 
Statistics) serves as a direct proxy for the economy-wide level of debt-related 
financing costs.6 Consistent with Choe et al. (1993), we express this variable as an 
average monthly yield calculated over the three months preceding the issue month. 
Our last macroeconomic explanatory variable is the runup in the daily return over the 
European equity market index (retrieved from Datastream). Choe et al. (1993) argue 
that periods with a high equity market return represent windows with smaller adverse 
selection costs, and hence a lower cost of raising equity(-linked) capital. In line with 
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these authors, we measure the market runup over the 60 trading days prior to the 
beginning of the issue month.  
In addition to the above macroeconomic determinants, we include a ‘Hot Straight 
Debt’ dummy variable equal to one for offerings issued during hot straight debt 
markets, and a ‘Hot Equity’ dummy variable equal to one for offerings issued during 
hot equity markets. According to Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), hot equity markets 
represent periods with smaller aggregate equity-related adverse selection costs, since 
firms tend to time their equity offerings during periods when these costs are low. 
Following a similar line of reasoning, hot straight debt markets might represent 
periods with smaller aggregate debt-related financing costs. In the spirit of Bayless 
and Chaplinsky (1996), we define hot straight debt markets as three contiguous 
months during which the three-month moving average of the aggregate straight debt 
volume exceeds the upper quartile of a three-month moving average of the aggregate 
straight debt volume measured over the research window. Hot equity markets are 
determined in a similar way.7    
 
3.2.3. Country-specific measures 
In line with Korkeamaki (2005), we use the Creditor and Shareholder Rights 
Indices retrieved from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) to capture the level of creditor- and 
shareholder-friendliness of our sample countries. The Creditor Rights Index (CRI) 
ranges between zero and four and measures the rights creditors have in bankruptcy. 
The Shareholder Rights Index (SRI) ranges between zero and five and measures the 
rights of minority shareholders. In order to avoid statistical problems caused by using 
an ordinal independent variable, we follow La Porta et al. (2000) and include a 
‘Creditorprotect’ dummy variable equal to one if the CRI is above the sample median 
(2) instead of the actual CRI, and a ‘Shareholderprotect’ dummy variable equal to one 
if the SRI is above the sample median (2.5) instead of the actual SRI. To account for 
the geographical clustering documented in Panel B of Table 2, we also include a 
‘French’ dummy variable equal to one for offerings made by French companies, and a 
‘UK’ dummy variable equal to one for offerings made by UK companies. In this way, 
we want to ensure that the coefficients of the Creditorprotect and Shareholderprotect 
dummy variables do not reflect characteristics of the French or UK markets that are 
unrelated to the level of legal protection offered to creditors and shareholders. 
 
 16
 
3.3. Research design 
 
As noted earlier, we model convertible debt issuance decisions of Western 
European firms by means of the two-step security choice framework proposed by 
Lewis et al. (1999). In a first step, we analyze the impact of the above-discussed 
explanatory variables on the choice between straight debt, convertible debt, and equity. 
A very straightforward way of modelling this first-step regression analysis would be 
by estimating an ordered probit model with straight debt, convertible debt and equity 
as viable options. This methodology has the disadvantage, however, that it treats 
convertible debt as a homogeneous security class. In order to account for the varying 
levels of ‘equity-likeness’ of convertible debt issues, Lewis et al. (1999) conduct a 
logistic regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the probability that the 
security will be converted into equity at maturity. This probability is equal to one for 
equity, equal to zero for straight debt, and continuous on the interval ]0,1[ for 
convertibles. Thus, Lewis et al.’s (1999) first-step regression essentially estimates the 
likelihood of a more equity-like security choice, with equity and straight debt 
representing two extreme financing options and convertible debt offerings ranging 
from very equity-like issues (with a high conversion probability) to very debt-like 
issues (with a low conversion probability).  
In line with Lewis et al. (1999), we use the conversion probability as dependent 
variable in our first-step security choice analysis. For convertible debt issues, this 
conversion probability is determined as N(d2), with N(.) the probability under a 
standard normal distribution function and d2 calculated as:  
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=                                                                    (1) 
 
In the above equation, δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield for the 
fiscal year-end preceding the announcement date; T is the initial convertible debt 
maturity (expressed in years); S is the price of the underlying stock measured one 
week prior to the announcement date; X is the conversion price; r is the continuously 
compounded yield on a 5-year German Treasury Bond (measured on the 
announcement date); and σ is the stock return volatility per annum.  
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We obtain an average (median) conversion probability of 27.96 (27.16)% for our 
Western European convertible debt sample, which is substantially smaller than the 
median conversion probability of 50.03% recorded for the US convertibles studied by 
Lewis et al. (1999). Hence, we can conclude that the typical Western European 
convertible debt offering is structured to be more debt-like in nature than the typical 
US convertible debt offering. Since Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) report that French 
firms use convertibles more as delayed equity financing than do other European firms, 
we expect convertibles issued by French companies to exhibit a more equity-like 
structure. The average conversion probability of the French convertibles is not 
significantly different from that of the other Western European convertibles, however 
(t-statistic equals 1.45). 
In a second and most important step of our empirical analysis, we examine what 
drives the security choice within the debt-type security subgroup (debt-like 
convertibles and straight debt) and the equity-type security subgroup (equity-like 
convertibles and equity), using the same explanatory variables as those included in the 
first-step analysis. The analysis of the debt-type subgroup enables us to evaluate the 
validity of the sweetened debt rationales of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Mayers (1998), whereas the analysis of the equity-
type subgroup allows us to assess the validity of the delayed equity rationale of Stein 
(1992).  
In line with Lewis et al. (1999), we use the actual conversion probability to 
distinguish debt-like from equity-like convertibles.8 Lewis et al. (1999) label all 
convertible debt offerings with a conversion probability lower than 50% debt-like, 
and all other convertibles equity-like. In this way, their convertible debt sample is 
almost evenly split between debt-like and equity-like issues. Using a similar criterion 
for our European sample, however, identifies only four convertibles as equity-like. 
Therefore, instead of the 50% benchmark proposed by Lewis et al. (1999), we use the 
upper quartile of the conversion probability recorded for our sample issues (32.88%) 
as a cutoff value for the debt-like versus equity-like classification. In this way, we 
identify 135 sample issues as debt-like and 44 sample issues as equity-like. In Section 
4, we discuss the robustness of our second-step regression results to the use of other 
measures for separating debt-like from equity-like convertibles.  
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4. Empirical analysis of the determinants of the convertible debt choice 
 
4.1. Determinants of the choice between straight debt, convertible debt, and equity 
 
Table 4 reports the results of logistic regression analyses examining the choice 
between straight debt, convertible debt, and equity. As mentioned earlier, the 
dependent variable is the ex-ante probability that the security will be converted into 
equity at maturity. We thus expect debt-related financing cost proxies to exhibit a 
positive regression coefficient, and equity-related financing cost proxies to exhibit a 
negative regression coefficient (and vice-versa for inverse financing cost proxies). 
The impact of variables that act as (inverse) proxies for both debt- and equity-related 
financing costs cannot be predicted a priori.  
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
The regression model presented in Column (1) includes only firm-specific 
explanatory variables. Even though the model is parsimonious, it correctly classifies 
74.50% of the financing decisions. This fraction is similar to the fraction of correctly 
classified observations obtained by papers examining the debt-equity choice (Marsh, 
1982; Jung et al., 1996). The pseudo-R2 (22.41%) and the percentage of concordant 
responses (79.20%) are slightly higher than the correspondent measures recorded by 
Lewis et al. (1999) (these authors do not mention the percentage of correctly 
classified observations obtained for their regressions). 
An inspection of the Wald-statistics for the individual regression parameters 
reveals that firm size is by far the most significant determinant of the security choice 
of Western European firms. This finding confirms Brounen et al.’s (2004) survey 
results indicating that financing choices of Western European companies are 
predominantly determined by their sizes. The negative sign of the total assets 
coefficient suggests that larger firms resort to more debt-like security types, which is 
consistent with results obtained by US-based security choice papers (Jung et al., 1996; 
Lewis et al., 1999). Next to the highly significant impact of the firm size parameter, 
we also find that companies with a higher stock return volatility are significantly more 
likely to issue a more equity-like security type. Lewis et al. (1999) obtain a similar 
result.  
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Column (2) of Table 4 displays the results of an extended security choice model in 
which we include economy-wide and country-specific measures. The regression 
coefficients and significance levels of the firm-specific variables remain largely 
unaffected by the inclusion of these additional explanatory variables. The findings 
with respect to the economy-wide and country-specific determinants are as follows. 
As expected, firms are significantly more likely to issue an equity-type security during 
periods with high interest rates. Moreover, firms are significantly more inclined to opt 
for an equity-like security during hot equity markets. The latter result supports 
Bayless and Chaplinsky’s (1996) argument that hot equity markets represent windows 
of opportunity with a low aggregate level of equity-related adverse selection costs. 
Lastly, all else equal, companies domiciled in the UK are significantly more likely to 
choose an equity-like security type. This is consistent with our earlier observation that 
the equity sample is dominated by UK offerings (see Panel B of Table 2).  
Two main conclusions emerge from the first-step security choice results reported 
in Table 4. First, in accordance with earlier studies (Marsh, 1982; Jung et al., 1996; 
Lewis et al., 1999), we find that security choices are partially predictable using pre-
offering information. Second, we find that macroeconomic determinants and security 
market conditions have a significant incremental impact over the firm–specific 
characteristics that are the traditional focus of security choice papers.  
 
4.2. Determinants of the choice between debt-like convertibles and straight debt 
 
To evaluate the validity of the sweetened debt viewpoint, we examine what 
motivates the choice between debt-like convertible debt and straight debt, while 
controlling for the factors that influence the likelihood of a debt-type security offering 
in general (i.e., the same determinants as those included in the first-step analysis). 
Table 5 displays the results of a logistic regression analysis with dependent variable 
equal to one for debt-like convertibles, and equal to zero for straight debt.  
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
The goodness-of-fit statistics of the regression are very high (pseudo-R2 of 
29.61%, 87.00% of concordant observations, and 83.20% of correctly classified 
observations). Thus, despite the structural similarities between debt-like convertibles 
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and straight debt, these securities seem to appeal to substantially different issuer 
clienteles. We now discuss the findings with regards to the three categories of 
explanatory variables included in the security choice model.  
Following hypothesis H1a, we expect that, conditioning on a debt-type security 
choice, firms with high debt-related financing costs cluster into issuing convertibles 
instead of straight debt. In line with this hypothesis, we find that firms with a high 
stock return volatility are significantly more likely to substitute debt-like convertible 
debt for straight debt. This finding supports the rationales of Green (1984), Brennan 
and Kraus (1987), and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), which all imply that 
convertibles are capable of mitigating risk-related financing costs. It is also consistent 
with the sequential-financing rationale of Mayers (1998), to the extent that stock 
return volatility acts as a proxy for the level of uncertainty regarding the value of 
future investment options. Lewis et al. (1999) obtain a similar result in a US context. 
The firm-specific regression results equally indicate that companies with a smaller 
total assets size are significantly more likely to substitute debt-like convertible debt 
for straight debt. To the extent that smaller firms face higher debt-related financing 
costs, this result supports the four rationales representing the sweetened debt 
viewpoint on convertible debt. It is also in line with US-based findings obtained by 
Lewis et al. (1999). A last significant difference between debt-like convertible debt 
issuers and straight debt issuers pertains to their pre-issue stock price performance: 
debt-like convertible issuers have a significantly larger pre-announcement stock runup 
than straight debt issuers. This finding is consistent with the (small) equity component 
embedded in the former securities, as well as with results reported by Lewis et al. 
(1999).  
The results on the impact of economy-wide financing cost measures on the 
propensity of a firm to substitute debt-like convertible debt for straight debt are as 
follows. First, we detect a significantly negative impact of the Hot Straight Debt 
dummy variable. Since hot straight debt markets are assumed to represent windows 
with a smaller aggregate level of debt-related financing costs, this finding is in line 
with hypothesis H2a. The other two aggregate debt-related financing cost proxies (i.e., 
the leading indicator and the German Treasury Bond yield) are both insignificant. The 
regression results also indicate that firms are significantly less likely to substitute 
debt-like convertibles for straight debt after a large stock market runup. This result is 
counterintuitive given the equity component embedded in debt-like convertibles. 
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Lastly, we find that firms are significantly more inclined to issue debt-like 
convertibles instead of straight debt during hot equity markets. This result is 
consistent with our intuition, since the former instruments comprise a (small) equity 
component. 
According to hypothesis H3a, firms domiciled in countries with a less creditor-
friendly business law should be more inclined to substitute debt-like convertibles for 
straight debt. The results presented in Table 5 provide no evidence for this prediction, 
however, as the coefficient of the Creditorprotect dummy variable is not significantly 
different from zero. We do find a significantly negative impact of the 
Shareholderprotect dummy variable, which is counterintuitive given the (small) equity 
component embedded in debt-like convertibles. Table 5 also reveals that, all else 
equal, French firms are significantly more likely to substitute debt-like convertible 
debt for straight debt than are other European companies.  
 
4.3. Determinants of the choice between equity-like convertibles and equity 
 
To evaluate the validity of the delayed equity viewpoint on convertible debt, we 
examine the determinants of the choice between equity-like convertible debt and 
equity. Table 6 displays the results of a logistic regression analysis with dependent 
variable equal to one for equity-like convertibles and equal to zero for equity. The 
right-hand side variables are similar to those incorporated in the first-step security 
choice analysis. The security choice model has a very high classificatory power 
(pseudo-R2 of 36.25%, 92.20% of concordant observations, and 88.80% of correctly 
classified observations). Thus, despite the fact that equity-like convertibles and equity 
have similar design characteristics, there seem to be substantial differences in the 
determinants driving these two security types.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
 
Following hypothesis H1b, we expect that, controlling for the factors driving an 
equity-type offering, companies with high equity-related adverse selection costs issue 
equity-like convertible debt instead of equity. Table 6 reveals, however, that none of 
the firm-specific equity-related cost proxies has a significant impact on the choice 
between equity-like convertibles and equity. Thus, we obtain no support for the 
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validity of the delayed equity rationale of Stein (1992) in a Western European context. 
The only significant difference between equity-like convertible debt issuers and 
equity issuers pertains to their stock return volatility: firms with a higher stock return 
volatility are significantly less likely to issue equity-like convertible debt instead of 
equity. Thus, whereas Table 5 suggests that debt-like convertible debt serves as an 
instrument to alleviate costs resulting from a high firm-specific risk level, Table 6 
indicates that equity-like convertible debt is not used for this purpose. Lewis et al. 
(1999) obtain a similar finding in a US context.  
Hypothesis H2b states that, during periods with high equity-related adverse 
selection costs, companies are more likely to issue equity-like convertible debt instead 
of equity. The results displayed in Table 6 partially support this prediction. On the one 
hand, we find that firms are significantly less inclined to substitute equity-like 
convertibles for equity during hot equity markets. Since hot equity markets are 
assumed to represent windows with a smaller level of equity-related financing costs 
(Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), this finding is consistent with hypothesis H2b. On 
the other hand, we also find that companies are significantly more likely to issue 
equity-like convertibles instead of equity when economic prospects (as proxied by the 
leading indicator) are more favorable. To the extent that the leading indicator acts as 
an inverse measure for the economy-wide level of equity-related financing costs, this 
result does not support hypothesis H2b. 
Following hypothesis H3b, firms domiciled in countries with weaker (stronger) 
shareholder protection rights should be more (less) inclined to substitute equity-like 
convertibles for equity. Consistent with this prediction, Table 6 indicates that the 
Shareholderprotect dummy variable has a significantly negative impact on the 
propensity of a firm to issue equity-like convertibles instead of equity. We also record 
a significantly negative influence of the Creditorprotect dummy variable, however, 
which is hard to reconcile with the (small) debt component embedded in equity-like 
convertible debt. Lastly, we find that French firms are significantly more likely to 
issue equity-like convertibles instead of equity than are other Western European 
companies. Combining the latter result with the significantly positive parameter of the 
French dummy variable in Table 5, we can conclude that French firms have a larger 
preference for convertible debt in general, both as a substitute for straight debt and as 
a substitute for equity. Importantly, this finding cannot be attributed to particular firm, 
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economy-wide or business law characteristics associated with French convertible 
offerings, since the regressions appropriately control for these factors.  
 
4.4. Robustness of results to other equity component measures 
 
The probability of conversion has the advantage that it simultaneously 
incorporates several convertible debt design features, thus providing a more complete 
picture of the equity-likeness of a convertible debt offering than do individual design 
parameters. Moreover, unlike design features that do not exist for straight debt and 
equity offerings (e.g., the conversion premium), the probability of conversion can be 
used both in the first- and the second-stage regressions since it is equal to zero (one) 
for straight debt (equity). A drawback of this equity component measure, however, is 
that it does not take into account whether a convertible is callable. Similar to the 
probability of conversion, the presence of a call feature might be an important 
indicator for the underlying motivations behind a convertible debt offering. As argued 
in Section 2, firms that want to use convertible debt as a delayed equity instrument or 
as a sequential-financing tool are more likely to add a call feature than firms that want 
to use convertible debt to reduce asset substitution or risk uncertainty costs. It turns 
out that only 16.76% of the convertibles in our dataset have a call feature, which casts 
doubt on the validity of the models of Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) in a Western 
European context. US convertibles, by contrast, are almost always callable (Lewis et 
al., 1998).  
To test the robustness of our findings to the use of the call feature as an alternative 
equity component measure, we reconduct the second-step regressions with debt-like 
(equity-like) convertibles defined as issues without (with) a call feature. The results of 
these regressions (not reported for parsimony) are very similar to the results obtained 
by means of the conversion probability. This is logical, since there is a significant 
connection between the presence of a call feature and the magnitude of the conversion 
probability of European convertibles: convertibles with a call feature have a 
significantly higher conversion probability than convertibles without a call feature (t-
statistic equals 2.47). Our main conclusions also remain similar when we use the 
conversion premium (i.e., a less sophisticated equity component measure than the 
conversion probability) to separate debt-like from equity-like convertibles. We can 
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thus conclude that our findings are not dependent on the specific benchmark used for 
the debt-like versus equity-like convertible debt classification.  
 
4.5. Comparison with other studies 
 
On the whole, the regression results displayed in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that 
European convertibles are used to alleviate firm-specific debt-related financing costs, 
but not to mitigate firm-specific equity-related financing costs. Hence, while US-
based papers obtain support both for the sweetened debt and the delayed equity 
viewpoints on convertible debt (Billingsley and Smith, 1996; Lewis et al., 1999; 
Graham and Harvey, 2001), our European results only support the former viewpoint.  
The divergence between our findings and the results obtained by US-based papers 
on convertible debt issuance motivations might be driven by supply-side differences 
between European and US convertible debt markets. More particularly, as noted 
earlier, European convertible debt issuers tend to be very large, mature companies. 
Such firms are likely to have more debt capacity than the small, high-risk, high-
growth firms dominating the US convertible debt issuer universe. According to the 
pecking order model of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms choose risky debt over equity 
provided that they have the necessary debt capacity. Thus, a first explanation for the 
highly debt-like structure of most European convertible debt issues might be the 
larger debt capacity of European convertible debt issuers relative to US issuers. Of 
course, given this large debt capacity, it could be questioned why European 
convertible debt issuers do not tap the straight debt market instead. The regression 
results displayed in Table 5 provide an answer to this question. More particularly, 
these results reveal that, even though European convertible debt issuers might have 
smaller debt-related financing costs than their US counterparts, they still have 
significantly higher debt-related financing costs than European straight debt issuers. 
Adding an (albeit small) conversion option to their debt offering might enable these 
companies to raise debt capital on more favorable terms than if they would issue 
‘plain vanilla’ straight debt. 
The differences in motivations between European and US convertible debt issuers 
might equally be driven by demand-side differences between European and US 
convertible debt markets. For example, in an article in Corporate Finance (2001), we 
read: ‘In the US, convertibles have been – and still are – an equity play. The 
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investment banks that deal in the product normally locate their teams on the same 
floor as the stock guys, and investors generally come from an equity background. All 
this makes perfect sense in a market where venture capital and investment risk-taking 
is part and parcel of the culture. European investors prefer stronger, more 
established credits, and generally look upon the convertibles market as an extension 
to the bond market.’ In other words, European convertible debt issuers might structure 
their offerings as sweetened debt issues in order to cater to the bond mentality of their 
investor base.  
A priori, we expected our conclusions to be highly similar to the survey results 
obtained by Bancel and Mittoo (2004a), who also focus on Western European 
convertible debt issuers.9 We effectively detect some striking similarities between 
their and our results. For example, Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) document that 70% of 
their respondents consider straight debt as an alternative for convertible debt, whereas 
only 23% consider equity as an alternative. This finding supports our conclusion that 
Western European firms use convertibles mainly as a substitute for straight debt. 
Moreover, while Graham and Harvey (2001) report that the ability to force conversion 
by calling the convertible debt is an important motivation for US convertible debt 
issuers, Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) obtain only modest support for this motivation 
among European issuers. This finding is consistent with our conclusion that Western 
European firms do not use convertibles as backdoor equity financing.  
Our results also differ from Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004a) findings on several 
dimensions, however. Most importantly, Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) document that 
about 86% of the European CFOs participating in their survey rank the delayed equity 
motivation as (very) important, whereas we do not obtain any evidence for the 
validity of the delayed equity viewpoint on convertible debt in a European context. 
Moreover, we find that the equity component size of French convertibles is not 
significantly larger than that of other European issues, which is inconsistent with 
Bancel and Mittoo’s (2004a) observation that the delayed equity motivation is more 
important for French firms than for other Western European companies. These 
divergences are probably attributable to the use of a different research methodology, 
i.e., a detailed survey analysis of 29 respondents in Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) versus 
a large-sample quantitative security choice analysis in the present paper. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper evaluates the validity of US-developed rationales on convertible debt 
in a Western European context. We test the sweetened debt rationales on convertible 
debt (Green, 1984; Brennan and Kraus, 1987; Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Mayers, 
1998) by comparing debt-like convertible debt issuers to straight debt issuers, and the 
delayed equity rationale on convertible debt (Stein, 1992) by comparing equity-like 
convertible debt issuers to equity issuers.  
Our study uncovers substantial differences in the factors driving European and US 
convertible debt issuance policies. In particular, whereas Lewis et al. (1999) report 
that US convertibles are used both as sweetened debt and as delayed equity (albeit not 
by the same firm types), our evidence is only consistent with the sweetened debt 
rationales of Green (1984), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and Brennan and Schwartz 
(1988). We identify both supply- and demand-side differences between the Western 
European and US convertible debt markets that might explain the divergence between 
our results and Lewis et al.’s (1999) US-based findings. 
We also extend Lewis et al.’s (1999) analysis by examining the influence of 
economy-wide financing costs on the choice between convertible debt, straight debt, 
and equity. We find that companies substitute debt-like convertible debt for straight 
debt during periods with a high economy-wide level of debt-related financing costs. 
Thus, debt-like convertibles are not only used to alleviate high firm-specific debt-
related costs, but also to sweeten high economy-wide debt-related costs. We also 
obtain some evidence that companies substitute equity-like convertible debt for equity 
during periods with a high economy-wide level of equity-related financing costs.  
In addition, we exploit the cross-country nature of our dataset to examine whether 
convertible debt offering policies are influenced by the levels of creditor and 
shareholder protection offered by local commercial laws. We find that companies 
domiciled in countries with less shareholder-friendly business laws are more likely to 
substitute equity-like convertible debt for equity. Hence, we can conclude that the few 
equity-like convertibles in the Western European convertible debt universe serve to 
alleviate economy-wide and country-specific equity-related costs, rather than to 
mitigate firm-specific adverse selection costs.  
 
 27
 
References 
 
Abhyankar, A. and Dunning, A., ‘Wealth effects of convertible bond and convertible 
preference share issues: an empirical analysis of the UK market’, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 23, 1999, pp. 1043-65. 
Ammann, M., Fehr, M. and Seiz, R., ‘New evidence on the announcement effect of 
convertible and exchangeable bonds’, Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, Vol. 16, 2006, pp. 43-63. 
Ammann, M., Kind, A. and Wilde, C., ‘Are convertible bonds underpriced? An 
analysis of the French market’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 
635-53. 
Artis, M.J. and Zhang, W., ‘International business cycles and the ERM: is there a 
European business cycle?’, International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 2, 
1997, pp. 1-16. 
Bancel, F. and Mittoo, U.R., ‘Why do European firms issue convertible debt?’, 
European Financial Management, Vol. 10, 2004a, pp. 339-73.  
Bancel, F. and Mittoo, U.R, ‘Cross-country determinants of capital structure choice: a 
survey of European firms’, Financial Management, Vol. 33, 2004b, pp. 103-32. 
Bayless, M. and Chaplinsky, S., ‘Is there a window of opportunity for seasoned equity 
issuance?’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, 1996, pp. 253-78. 
Billingsley, R.S., Lamy, R.E. and Thompson, G.R., ‘The choice among debt, equity, 
and convertible bonds’, Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 11, 1988, pp. 43-55. 
Billingsley, R.S. and Smith, D.M., ‘Why do firms issue convertible debt?’, Financial 
Management, Vol. 25, 1996, pp. 93-99. 
Brennan, M. and Kraus, A., ‘Efficient financing under asymmetric information’, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, 1987, pp. 1246-60. 
Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E., ‘The case for convertibles’, Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 1, 1988, pp. 55-64. 
Brigham, E., ‘An analysis of convertible debt: theory and some empirical evidence’, 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 21, 1966, pp. 35-54. 
Brounen, D., de Jong, A. and Koedijk, K., ‘Corporate finance in Europe: confronting 
theory with practice’, Financial Management, Vol. 33, 2004, pp. 71-101. 
 28
 
Burlacu, R., ‘New evidence on the pecking order hypothesis: the case of French 
convertible bonds’, Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 10, 2000, 
pp. 439-59. 
Chang, S.-C., Chen, S.-S. and Liu, Y., ‘Why firms use convertibles: a further test of 
the sequential-financing hypothesis’, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, 
2004, pp. 1163-83. 
Choe, H., Masulis, R.W. and Nanda, V., ‘Common stock offerings across the business 
cycle: theory and evidence’, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 1, 1993, pp. 3-31. 
de Roon, F. and Veld, C., ‘Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and 
warrant-bond loans: an empirical analysis for the Dutch market’, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, Vol. 22, 1998, pp. 1481-1506. 
Dutordoir, M. and Van de Gucht, L., ‘Are European convertibles more debt-like than 
the US issues? An empirical analysis’, Working paper (SSRN, 2004). 
Essig, S., ‘Convertible securities and capital structure determinants’, PhD 
Dissertation (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 
1991). 
Gosh, C., Varma, R. and Woolridge, J.R., ‘An analysis of exchangeable debt offers’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 28, 1990, pp. 251-63. 
Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R., ‘The theory and practice of corporate finance: 
evidence from the field’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 60, 2001, pp. 187-
243. 
Green, R., ‘Investment incentives, debt, and warrants’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 13, 1984, pp. 115-36. 
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T. and Titman, S., ‘The debt-equity choice’, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, 2001, pp. 1-24. 
Jung, K., Kim, Y.-C. and Stulz, R.M., ‘Timing, investment opportunities, managerial 
discretion, and the security issue decision’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
42, 1996, pp. 159-85.  
Korajczyk, R.A. and Levy, A., ‘Capital structure choice: macroeconomic conditions 
and financial constraints’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, 2003, pp. 75-
109. 
Korkeamaki, T.P., ‘Effects of law on corporate financing practices – international 
evidence from convertible bond issues’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, 
2005, pp. 809-31. 
 29
 
Korkeamaki, T.P. and Moore, W.T., ‘Convertible bond design and capital investment: 
the role of call provisions’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, 2004, pp. 391-405. 
Krasker, W.S., ‘Stock price movements in response to stock issues under asymmetric 
information’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, 1986, pp. 93-105. 
Krishnaswami, S. and Yaman, D., ‘The role of convertible bonds in alleviating 
contracting costs’, Working Paper (SSRN, 2004). 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., ‘Legal 
determinants of external finance’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 1997, pp. 1131-50. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., ‘Law and finance’, 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, 1998, pp. 1113-55. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., ‘Agency problems 
and dividend policies around the world’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, 2000, pp. 1-
33. 
Lewis, C.M., Rogalski, R.J. and Seward, J.K., ‘Agency problems, information 
asymmetries, and convertible debt security design’, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, Vol. 7, 1998, pp. 32-59.  
Lewis, C.M., Rogalski, R.J. and Seward, J.K., ‘Is convertible debt a substitute for 
straight debt or for common equity?’ Financial Management, Vol. 28, 1999, pp. 5-
27. 
Lewis, C.M., Rogalski, R.J. and Seward, J.K., ‘Industry conditions, growth 
opportunities and market reactions to convertible debt financing decisions’, Journal 
of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 153-81. 
Loncarski, I., ter Horst, J. and Veld, C., ‘Why do companies issue convertible bonds? 
A review of theory and empirical evidence’, in Renneboog L.D.R., (ed.), Advances 
in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006). 
Lucas, D.J. and McDonald, R.L., ‘Equity issues and stock price dynamics’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 45, 1990, pp. 1019-43. 
Marsh, P., ‘The choice between equity and debt: an empirical study’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 37, 1982, pp. 121-44. 
Mayers, D., ‘Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real 
investment options’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 47, 1998, pp. 83-102. 
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S., ‘Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
firms have information that investors do not have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 13, 1984, pp. 187-221. 
 30
 
Noddings, T.C., Christoph, S.C. and Noddings, J.G., The International Handbook of 
Convertibles (Chicago: Glenlake, 2001). 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F. and Zingales, L., ‘Why do companies go public? An empirical 
analysis’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, 1998, pp. 27-64. 
Pilcher, C.J., ‘Raising capital with convertible securities’, Michigan Business Studies 
(University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 1955). 
Stein, J.C., ‘Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 32, 1992, pp. 3-21. 
Wolfe, S., Daliakopoulos, S. and Gwilym, O.A.P., ‘Equity valuation effects of the 
issuance of convertible bonds: UK evidence’, Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. 9, 1999, 
pp. 7-18. 
‘2001 ways to use convertibles’, Corporate Finance, Vol. 195, 2001, pp. 24-25 (no 
author mentioned). 
 31
 
Endnotes 
1 Western European convertible issuance volume increased from $1.76 billion in 1990 to $19.54 billion 
in 2004. For comparison, over the same time span US convertible debt issuance volume rose from 
$10.48 billion to $35.74 billion (source: Thomson ONE Banker). Thus, the European convertible 
market seems to be rapidly catching up with the US market. 
2 Next to the pan-Western European analyses of Bancel and Mittoo (2004a,b), there are also some 
studies analyzing convertibles issued in individual Western European countries. de Roon and Veld 
(1998) examine Dutch convertibles, Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) and Wolfe et al. (1999) 
investigate UK convertibles, Burlacu (2000) studies French convertibles, and Ammann et al. (2006) 
examine German and Swiss convertibles. However, these studies focus on the stock price effects of 
convertible debt offering announcements rather than on the issuer motivations behind these offerings. 
3 Lewis et al. (1999) only consider the sweetened debt rationale of Green (1984). In this paper, by 
contrast, we also consider the rationales of Brennan and Kraus (1987), Brennan and Schwartz (1988), 
and Mayers (1998). The reason why is that, as noted earlier, the empirical proxies that can be used for 
capturing the different debt-related financing costs considered by the sweetened debt rationales on 
convertible debt are largely similar. Therefore, we can only test the joint validity of these four 
rationales. Some recent empirical studies (Chang et al., 2004; Korkeamaki and Moore, 2004) 
specifically test the validity of Mayers’ (1998) rationale by studying financing patterns around 
convertible debt calls. Our study focuses on determinants that are observable at the moment of the 
security offering decision, however.  
4 See Loncarski et al. (2006) for an extensive overview of empirical evidence regarding convertible 
debt issuance motivations.  
5 See Korkeamaki (2005) for an overview of the literature on the influence of business laws on 
financing choices.  
6 The German interest rate plays a leading role in the European economy (Artis and Zhang, 1997), 
hence our choice for the yield on a German Treasury Bond as a measure for the general interest rate 
level in Western Europe. Our findings are robust to the use of other yield measures (e.g., the 10-year 
German Treasury Bond yield, the 5-year US Treasury Bond yield, etc.). Results of all robustness 
checks described throughout the paper are available upon request. 
7 As there is no reason to exclude offerings that do not fulfill the sample selection criteria from the 
issuance volume calculations, we base these calculations on the initial straight debt and equity samples 
downloaded from Bloomberg (not on the final samples used in the security choice analyses). The 
moving average for a straight debt offering made in month t is determined as (number of Western 
European straight debt offerings in month t-3 + number of Western European straight debt offerings in 
month t-2 + number of Western European straight debt offerings in month t-1)/3. For equity offerings, 
calculations are analogous. Hence, there is no endogeneity problem since we only use issuance data 
from before the issue month.  
8 We obtain similar results when we use the predicted conversion probability obtained from the first 
step instead of the actual conversion probability to subdivide the convertible debt sample into debt-like 
and equity-like offerings.  
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9 Bancel and Mittoo (2004b), by contrast, examine firms that have ‘seriously considered issuing 
convertible debt over the past ten years’. These firms do not necessarily coincide with the actual 
convertible debt issuers examined in our paper.  
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Table 1  
Overview of empirical evidence regarding the motivations for convertible debt offerings 
 
This table displays the results of prior empirical papers on the motives for convertible debt offerings. 
Yes (No) indicates whether the evidence supports (does not support) the model or hypothesis 
mentioned in the previous column. 
Paper Scope Tested rationales  Evidence 
Survey analyses    
Pilcher (1955) US Delayed equity viewpoint) 
Sweetened debt viewpoint 
(no specific theories mentioned) 
 
Yes 
No 
Brigham (1966) US Delayed equity viewpoint 
Sweetened debt viewpoint 
(no specific theories mentioned) 
 
Yes 
No 
Billingsley and Smith (1996) US Delayed equity viewpoint 
Sweetened debt viewpoint 
(no specific theories mentioned) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Graham and Harvey (2001) US Green (1984) 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) 
Stein (1992) 
Mayers (1998) 
 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004a) Europe Green (1984) 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) 
Stein (1992) 
Mayers (1998) 
 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004b) Europe Green (1984) 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) 
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) 
Stein (1992) 
Mayers (1998) 
 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Quantitative analyses    
Lewis et al. (1999) US Green (1984) (for debt-like conv.) 
Stein (1992) (for equity-like conv.) 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Chang et al. (2004) US Mayers (1998) 
 
Yes 
Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) US Mayers (1998) Yes 
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Table 2 
 
Temporal and geographical dispersion of Western European security offerings 
 
The dataset consists of 419 straight debt offerings made by 256 Western European industrial companies, 
179 convertible debt offerings made by 148 Western European industrial companies, and 214 equity 
offerings made by 192 Western European industrial companies. N denotes the number of observations. 
Panel A presents the number and percentage of security offerings by issue year. Panel B reports the number 
and percentage of security offerings by sample country. 
 
Panel A: security offerings by issue year 
 
Issue year                  Straight debt                Convertible debt                     Equity 
 N % N % N % 
1994 11 2.63% 15 8.38% 4 1.87% 
1995 21 5.01% 2 1.12% 8 3.74% 
1996 35 8.35% 7 3.91% 26 12.15% 
1997 37 8.83% 16 8.94% 8 3.74% 
1998 42 10.02% 16 8.94% 12 5.61% 
1999 49 11.69% 18 10.06% 14 6.54% 
2000 45 10.74% 22 12.29% 28 13.08% 
2001 33 7.88% 18 10.06% 27 12.62% 
2002 28 6.68% 20 11.17% 40 18.69% 
2003 27 6.44% 28 15.64% 21 9.81% 
2004 91 21.72% 17 9.50% 25 11.68% 
Total 419 100.00% 179 100.00% 214 100.00% 
 
Panel B: security offerings by country of domicile of the issuing firm 
 
Country                  Straight debt                Convertible debt                     Equity 
 N % N % N % 
Austria 6 1.43% 2 1.12% 7 3.27% 
Belgium 5 1.19% 3 1.68% 2 0.93% 
Denmark 2 0.48% 1 0.56% 8 3.74% 
Finland 23 5.49% 6 3.35% 7 3.27% 
France 110 26.25% 76 42.46% 26 12.15% 
Germany 44 10.50% 18 10.06% 24 11.21% 
Greece 0 0.00% 2 1.12% 0 0.00% 
Ireland 1 0.24% 0 0.00% 3 1.40% 
Italy 28 6.68% 7 3.91% 2 0.93% 
the Netherlands 26 6.21% 20 11.17% 14 6.54% 
Norway 25 5.97% 2 1.12% 9 4.21% 
Spain 8 1.91% 3 1.68% 5 2.34% 
Portugal 2 0.48% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Sweden  30 7.16% 5 2.79% 10 4.67% 
Switzerland 24 5.73% 20 11.17% 17 7.94% 
Unit. Kingdom 85 20.29% 14 7.82% 80 37.38% 
Total 419 100.00% 179 100.00% 214 100.00% 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive statistics for Western European straight debt, convertible debt and equity samples 
 
This table reports descriptive firm-specific statistics for samples of straight debt, convertible debt and equity offerings made by Western European industrial companies 
between 1994 and 2004. The security samples are retrieved from Bloomberg. The straight debt sample consists of 419 offerings, the convertible debt sample consists of 179 
offerings, and the equity sample consists of 214 offerings. Firm-specific characteristics are obtained from Datastream and measured at fiscal year-end prior to the security 
announcement date, unless otherwise indicated. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Volatility denotes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns estimated 
over trading days -240 to -40 relative to the announcement date. Taxes/TA is taxes paid divided by total assets. Slack/TA denotes the sum of cash and marketable securities 
divided by total assets. Issue Size/MV is the issue size divided by the market value of equity, measured one week prior to the announcement date. Stock Runup is the 
cumulative stock return, measured over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. M/B ratio is the market to book ratio, measured as (total assets + market value 
of equity measured one week prior to the announcement date - book value of equity)/total assets. TA is the book value of total assets. D (D-) denotes an (inverse) debt-related 
cost proxy, E (E-) denotes an (inverse) equity-related cost proxy. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Variable          Straight debt 
         (1) 
        Convertible debt 
        (2) 
       Equity 
         (3) 
     t-stat. for pairwise differences in mean values  
 Mean 
 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Conv. debt          
vs. str. debt 
  (4) 
Conv. debt 
vs. equity 
 (5) 
 Straight debt 
 vs. equity 
  (6) 
Leverage (D) 0.300 0.294 0.264 0.236 0.239 0.206 -2.66*** 1.47 4.19***
Volatility (D) 0.021 0.019 0.030 0.028 0.032 0.028 7.74*** -1.19 -8.42***
Taxes/TA (D-) 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.33 1.03 1.07 
Slack/TA (E) 0.089 0.069 0.117 0.089 0.154 0.076 3.40*** -2.47*** -4.82***
Issue Size/MV (E) 0.161 0.074 0.225 0.161 0.279 0.153 2.66*** -1.61 -3.84***
Stock Runup (E-) 0.030 0.035 0.084 0.062 0.095 0.055 2.62*** -0.39 -2.71***
M/B (D,E) 1.531 1.191 2.003 1.368 3.118 1.793 3.11*** -4.07*** -6.31***
TA ($ mio) (D-,E-) 15,086.136 5,969.014 6,034.121 1,087.935 1,874.480 410.412 -9.97*** 4.94*** 18.16***
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Table 4 
 
Analysis of determinants of the choice between straight debt, convertible debt, and equity 
 
This table displays the results of logistic regressions analyzing the determinants of the choice between 
straight debt, convertible debt, and equity for Western European companies. The straight debt sample 
consists of 419 offerings, the convertible debt sample consists of 179 offerings, and the equity sample 
consists of 214 offerings. The dependent variable is the risk-neutral probability that the security will be 
converted into equity at maturity. Firm-specific determinants are measured at fiscal year-end prior to 
the announcement date, unless otherwise mentioned. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. 
Volatility denotes the standard deviation of the daily stock returns estimated over trading days -240 to -
40 relative to the announcement date. Taxes/TA is taxes paid divided by total assets. Slack/TA is the 
sum of cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. Issue Size/MV is the issue size divided 
by the market value of equity, measured one week prior to the announcement date. Stock Runup is the 
cumulative stock return, measured over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. M/B is 
the market to book ratio, measured as (total assets + market value of equity measured one week prior to 
the announcement date - book value of equity)/total assets. Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets. Leading Indicator is the 6-month leading economic indicator for the European 
economy, expressed as the average level over the three months prior to the issue month divided by the 
average value over the 12 months prior to the issue month. TB Yield is the yield on 5-year German 
Treasury Bonds, expressed as an average value calculated over the three months preceding the issue 
month. Market Runup is the return over the Datastream European equity market index, calculated over 
the 60 trading days prior to the beginning of the issue month. Hot Straight Debt (Equity) is a dummy 
variable equal to one for offerings issued during hot straight debt (equity) windows, with hot straight 
debt and equity windows determined following the criterion outlined in Bayless and Chaplinsky 
(1996). Creditorprotect (Shareholderprotect) is a dummy variable equal to one for offerings issued by 
firms domiciled in a country with a Creditor Rights (Shareholder Rights) Index higher than the sample 
median. Creditor and Shareholder Rights Index values are obtained from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). 
France (UK) is a dummy variable equal to one for issues made by French (UK) firms. D (D-) denotes 
an (inverse) debt-related cost proxy, E (E-) denotes an (inverse) equity-related cost proxy. Positive 
regression coefficients indicate that the explanatory variable increases the odds in favor of a more 
equity-like security type. Wald-statistics are inserted in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Variable                                (1)                                      (2) 
Intercept 6.019*** (43.273) 16.229** (3.924) 
Firm-specific determinants   
     Leverage (D) -0.050 (0.163) 0.013 (0.009) 
     Volatility (D) 13.109* (3.400) 18.231** (5.103) 
     Taxes/TA (D-) -0.134 (0.001) -3.090 (0.456) 
     Slack/TA (E) 0.929 (1.436) 1.187 (1.914) 
     Issue Size/MV (E) 0.031 (0.010) -0.104 (0.085) 
     Stock Runup (E-) 0.550 (2.528) 0.552 (2.152) 
     M/B (D, E) 0.037 (0.661) -0.016 (0.094) 
     Ln(TA) (D-, E-) -0.515*** (80.541) -0.595*** (83.633) 
Economy-wide determinants   
     Leading Indicator (D-, E-)  -9.087 (1.038) 
     TB Yield (D)  28.246*** (8.241) 
     Market Runup (E-)  -1.323 (0.740) 
     Hot Straight Debt (D-)  -0.329 (1.888) 
     Hot Equity (E-)  0.343* (2.750) 
Country-specific determinants   
     Creditorprotect (D-)  0.411 (1.804) 
     Shareholderprotect (E-)  -0.417 (2.112) 
     France   0.092 (0.057) 
     UK   1.474*** (21.075) 
Classificatory power   
     Pseudo-R2: 
     % Concordant: 
     % Correctly classified: 
22.41% 
79.20% 
74.50% 
28.82% 
82.70% 
76.40% 
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Table 5 
 
Analysis of determinants of the choice between debt-like convertible debt and straight debt 
 
This table displays the results of logistic regressions analyzing the determinants of the choice between 
debt-like convertible debt and straight debt for Western European companies. Debt-like convertible 
debt offerings are defined as convertibles with a probability of conversion smaller than the upper 
quartile of the probability of conversion calculated for the entire convertible debt sample (32.88%). The 
straight debt sample consists of 419 offerings, and the debt-like convertible debt sample consists of 135 
offerings. The dependent variable takes the value one for debt-like convertible debt, and zero for 
straight debt. All explanatory variables are defined as outlined above Table 4. D (D-) denotes an 
(inverse) debt-related cost proxy, E (E-) denotes an (inverse) equity-related cost proxy. Positive 
regression coefficients indicate that the explanatory variable increases the odds in favor of a debt-like 
convertible debt offering. Wald-statistics are inserted in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Variable  
Intercept -10.571 (0.658) 
Firm-specific determinants  
     Leverage (D) -0.175 (0.548) 
     Volatility (D) 74.350*** (36.487) 
     Taxes/TA (D-) 2.244 (0.092) 
     Slack/TA (E) 1.901 (1.561) 
     Issue Size/MV (E) -1.128 (2.391) 
     Stock Runup (E-) 1.652*** (7.115) 
     M/B (D, E) -0.010 (0.015) 
     Ln(TA) (D-, E-) -0.512*** (29.286) 
Economy-wide determinants  
     Leading Indicator (D-, E-) 22.123 (2.376) 
     TB Yield (D) -17.569 (1.523) 
     Market Runup (E-) -5.724** (6.259) 
     Hot Straight Debt (D-) -1.090*** (8.828) 
     Hot Equity (E-) 0.711** (6.403) 
Country-specific determinants  
     Creditorprotect (D-) -0.521 (1.781) 
     Shareholderprotect (E-) -1.477*** (12.676) 
     France  1.248** (6.397) 
     UK  0.676 (1.475) 
Classificatory power  
     Pseudo-R2: 
     % Concordant: 
     % Correctly classified: 
29.61% 
87.00% 
83.20% 
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Table 6 
 
Analysis of determinants of the choice between equity-like convertible debt and equity 
 
This table displays the results of logistic regressions analyzing the determinants of the choice between 
equity-like convertible debt and equity. Equity-like convertible debt offerings are defined as 
convertibles with a probability of conversion larger than or equal to the upper quartile of the probability 
of conversion calculated for the entire convertible debt sample (32.88%). The equity-like convertible 
debt sample consists of 44 offerings, and the equity sample consists of 214 offerings. The dependent 
variable takes the value one for equity-like convertible debt, and zero for equity. All explanatory 
variables are defined as outlined above Table 4. D (D-) denotes an (inverse) debt-related cost proxy, E 
(E-) denotes an (inverse) equity-related cost proxy. Positive regression coefficients indicate that the 
explanatory variable increases the odds in favor of an equity-like convertible debt offering. Wald-
statistics are inserted in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
Variables  
Intercept -69.032*** (9.689) 
Firm-specific determinants  
     Leverage (D) 0.386 (0.808) 
     Volatility (D) -131.600*** (12.600) 
     Taxes/TA (D-) -0.805 (0.005) 
     Slack/TA (E) -1.583 (0.488) 
     Issue Size/MV (E) -0.453 (0.299) 
     Stock Runup (E-) 0.047 (0.002) 
     M/B (D, E) 0.183 (1.969) 
     Ln(TA) (D-, E-) -0.088 (0.228) 
Economy-wide determinants  
     Leading Indicator (D-, E-) 72.685*** (10.153) 
     TB Yield (D) 40.400 (2.006) 
     Market Runup (E-) -1.031 (0.059) 
     Hot Straight Debt (D-) 0.475 (0.473) 
     Hot Equity (E-) -1.333** (4.206) 
Country-specific determinants  
     Creditorprotect (D-) -1.511* (3.158) 
     Shareholderprotect (E-) -1.871* (2.916) 
     France  2.350* (3.796) 
     UK  -1.043 (0.742) 
Classificatory power  
     Pseudo-R2: 
     % Concordant: 
     % Correctly classified: 
36.25% 
92.20% 
88.80% 
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Appendix 
 
The specific selection criteria imposed on the individual security samples are as 
follows: 
- Exclude exchangeable bonds from the convertible debt sample:  
As shown by Gosh et al. (1990), issuer motivations for exchangeable offerings 
(i.e., bonds convertible into shares of a firm other than the issuing company) are 
substantially different from issuer motivations for convertible offerings. We thus 
eliminate the exchangeable bonds from the convertible debt sample. 
- Exclude secondary equity offerings: 
Secondary equity offerings represent no new capital and are thus likely to be 
driven by substantially different factors than primary equity offerings. Hence, 
we do not include these offerings in the final sample. 
- Exclude issues of different security types made by the same firm during the same 
fiscal year: 
Within our initial dataset, there are several observations involving two or more 
different financing instruments issued by the same firm during the same fiscal 
year. We count 46 dual straight debt-equity issues, 40 dual convertible debt-
straight debt issues, 16 dual convertible debt-equity issues, and 13 triple straight 
debt, convertible debt, and equity issues. In line with Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
we remove these dual and triple security issues from the dataset. This operation 
makes the logistic regression results more easily interpretable, since only 
exclusive financing choices are included. Our findings remain qualitatively 
similar, however, when we leave the dual and triple offerings in the sample.  
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